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This collection brings together nine essays by ten leading philosophers of science,
divided into two groups. The first tranche consists of six essays under the rather broad
theme of ‘scientific method’. Here we find contributions on topics such as explanation,
laws of nature, structuralism and the scientific realism debate. The second part then
consists of three essays devoted to philosophical issues in the foundations each of the
three pillars of modern physical theory: relativity theory, quantum theory (with a
focus on the infinite dimensional case) and statistical mechanics.
In and of themselves, the essays are, without exception, of first rate quality. And,
in this regard, as a collection, this book represents a worthwhile contribution that
will be of particular value to graduate students looking for an overview of the key
issues in the contemporary philosophy of physical science. Here my focus will not
be upon the individual merits of the essays. Rather, in this short review I would like
to propose a hypothesis regarding the disunity of philosophy of science, that I take
this collection to well illustrate. My hypothesis, in brief, is that the core debates in
contemporary philosophy of science are worryingly unintegrated, and that this lack
of integration is damaging to the field as a whole. I will illustrate my hypothesis by
drawing upon three of the nine essays, and in particular by using Kyle Stanford’s
discussion of the realism debate (Chapter 4) as a filter through which to view Michael
Strevens’ essay on statistical explanation (Chapter 2) and John Norton’s essay on the
ontology of spacetime (Chapter 7).
The main focus of Stanford’s essay is the realism/instrumentalism dialectic, and
a group of broadly ‘quietist’ responses due to Howard Stein, Arthur Fine and Simon
Blackburn. Take scientific realism as an inflationary thesis, put forward in favour of
an interpretation of (at least aspects of) our scientific theories as real, in some sense.
Instrumentalism is then usefully characterised as a deflationary thesis, put forward in
favour of an interpretation of our scientific theories as mere instruments, in some sense.
To different degrees and in subtly different ways, Stein, Fine and Blackburn all insist
there does not really exist a substantive distinction between the two views. Rather,
we would do better to follow a third, quieter course, where we simply abstain from
entering into debate regarding meta-theoretical questions as to the interpretation of
physical theories. Stein, who to my mind articulates such a position most persua-
sively, focuses upon the classic version of scientific realism, where the sense of ‘real’
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is cashed out in terms of claims regarding the successful reference of terms within
the scientific theory. He suggest that an instrumentalist would do well to simply help
themselves to such a representational function of scientific language, only with an
instrumentalist spin. In such circumstances, the distinction between instrumentalism
and realism becomes a largely verbal one: ‘reference to reference has failed to stake
out any claim to which a sophisticated instrumentalist should feel a need to object’
(Stein 1989, p.51).
The thrust of Stein’s point drives in much the same direction as Fine’s idea of
a ‘Natural Ontological Attitude’ (NOA). As Stanford notes, ‘NOA insists that...the
various things that the truth of various claims might amount to, in science as in ev-
eryday living, are multiple and many-splendored: we are guided in what to make of
our acceptance (or the “truth”) of a particular scientific claim in a particular context
by circumstances specific to it, and that is all there is to say’ (Stanford 2015, p.113).
A sceptical attitude towards the coherence of the realist/instrumentalist dialectic is
also taken by Blackburn. In particular, in the 2002 article discussed by Stanford, he
gives short shrift to the claim that the realist has unique access to an explanation for
the predictive success of science. Rather, he takes the the explanations provided by
science itself as an explanation for the predictive success of science. In his view, it
does not even make sense to ask for a further second-order explanation of scientific
phenomena: ‘there is no getting behind the explanation’ (Blackburn 2002, p.113). The
exploration and evaluation of these intriguing lines of thought seems to me an impor-
tant task, and Stanford’s essay is a worthy effort in this direction. I will not further
pursue such thoughts here.
Rather, I would like to articulate the following hypothesis: The prima facie plau-
sibility of the quietist line vis-a´-vis the realism debate should be rather worrying for
those working on other topics in the philosophy of science. If it is simply wrong-
headed to try and look for substantive interpretative questions ‘behind’ the models
and explanations provided by scientific theories themselves, then why is much (if
not most) of contemporary philosophy of science predicated upon the coherence of
such an activity? Surely, if we were to accept the quietist perspective, then much of
the contemporary discussions of explanation, laws of nature and the interpretation of
physical theories would be rendered otiose. Once we adopt the quietest viewpoint, we
cannot consistently confine our vision to the realism debate in isolation. Alternatively;
putting things the other way round: if there are good arguments that such interpre-
tive work is a worthwhile activity, then these arguments surely should be successfully
brought to bear against quietism in the broader realism/instrumentalism context. By
philosophising about science in such an unintegrated manner we are at best missing
a trick, and at worst wasting our time! Let me illustrate this point by reference to two
of the other essays in the volume.
First consider the philosophical debate regarding probabilistic explanation as ad-
mirably explored in the essay by Michael Stevens. Philosophical accounts of proba-
bilistic explanation have as their goal attempts to make sense of successful probabilis-
tic explanations in quantum mechanics, medical science and statistical physics. In
his essay, Strevens provides a dexterous and concise critical examination of the var-
ious philosophical accounts. What is not discussed, however, is the reason why we
should want a philosophical theory of probabilistic explanation in the first place. If
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we take our cues from the quietists, in particular Blackburn, then all attempts towards
such a theory are futile. From their perspective, trying to ground the probabilistic ex-
planations found in science in terms of deeper underlying structure, such as causes,
propensities or robustness of processes, amounts to trying to peak behind a curtain
that simply isn’t there. My suggestion here is not that this is necessarily what we
should think, but rather that such ‘meta-philosophical’ questions need to be consid-
ered in much greater detail, and in this regard the lack of integration in this volume
of essays is a missed opportunity.
A similar point can be made about John Norton’s elegant essay ‘What can we learn
about the ontology of space and time from the theory of relativity?’. Here again we
have a broad-ranging yet concise exposition of a central topic in contemporary philos-
ophy of physical science written by a noted expert. In a manner that will be largely
accessible to those without technical expertise, Norton reviews key issues such as
the conventionality of simultaneity, the hole argument, and the equivalence principle.
But once again, this discussion is pursued independently of the ‘meta-philosophical’
question of how we come to be able to talk of the ontology of space and time in the
first place. As Norton himself notes in his introduction: ‘We are not compelled to
adopt realism. But without it, there is no rhyme or reason in answers to the question
of the title’ (Norton 2015, p.187). Furthermore, on the crucial question of interpreting
the (putatively) distinct roles of the manifold and metric structures within general
relativity, he notes that it is only realism that ‘enjoins us to take the division seriously’
(Norton 2015, p.200). Without realism, the content of much contemporary debate in
the foundations of relativity theory is rendered questionable. And, once again, if we
take quietism seriously, we would seem best behoved to take interpretational debate
lightly.
My hypothesis was that a lack of integration between the key debates in the phi-
losophy of science is damaging to the field. In particular, it seems to me that debates
regarding explanation and ontology in physical theory cannot sensibly be carried out
without settling broader meta-philosophical questions regarding realism and truth in
the context of science. While the essays of this volume represent some of the best
that contemporary philosophy of physical science has to offer, taken together, they
are emblematic of a disunity and disconnectedness in the field that is, to my mind,
rather worrying.
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